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Best available copyRecent interest in efficiency wage and insider/outsider models of wage 
determination has drawn attention to employer-based wage differences.  Alter- 
natively, these differences may simply reflect temporary, randm  errors by 
wage-setters.  This paper provides strong evidence against the possibility 
that employer wage variations are temporary or randm,  along with additional 
verification of the existence of substantial employer wage differences within 
and between industries. 
The variance of wages is analyzed in  a unique data set: wages paid to 
individual workers in selected blue- and white-collar occupations fram a 
sixyear  panel of anployers  within a single standard metropolitan statistical 
area.  The most conservative estimate of establishment wage differentials in 
this sanple  (controlling for very detailed job classification) yields a stan- 
dard deviation of approxhmtely 12 percent within industry, or 18 percent, 
including interindustry differentials.  Wage differences among employers are 
shown  to be virtually stationary over time and related to establishment size, 
but not consistently to changes in establishment employment. 
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Best available copyThe existence of lqe  employer-based wage differences among appar- 
ently equivalent workers is often taken as supporting evidence for the exis- 
tence of efficiency wages or implicit profitsharing  (see  Dickens and Katz 
1 
[1987], for ample).  The two main alternative hypotheses that have been 
explored are sorting by worker-quality and by ampensating  differentials, nei- 
ther of which has found strong support in statistical tests.  This paper tests 
a thin3 alternative, whether wage differences among qloyers  are the result 
of randm,  tmporary errors. 
If employer differentials are the result of errors, the efficiency of 
the labor market may be enhanced by their elimination, prhaps through govern- 
ment subsidies of information gathering and dissemination.  On the other hand, 
if these differentials are efficient wages or profit-es,  they may be ap- 
propriate second-best solutions to monitoring or agency problems endemic to 
the labor market, but have implications for other policy, such as trade or 
antidiscrimination policy, as demonstrated in FWlm  and Summers  (1986), or 
for macmewndc  policy, as shm in  Weitzman  (1986). 
Efficiency wage aqnnents posit causality between workers' wages and 
on-the-job productivity (Yellen [1984], Stiglitz [I9841  ) .  Thus, sane employ- 
ers may maximize profits by pay-  a differential above the market~=learing 
wage, if resulting hxements in  productivity exceed costs of the differen- 
tial.  At least five sources of inrreased productivity have been modeled: 
reduced monitoring  (or shirking) costs (for exanple, Bulm  and Summers 
[1986]), decreased turnover (Salop [1979]),  sociological considerations 
(Akerlof  [1982]), market insulation, and corporate consistency  (keringer  and 
Piore [1971]). 
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In contrast, implicit profi-ing  models of wage variation  (also 
called insider/outsider, rentsharing,  and bargaining models) assum the ex- 
istence of variations in f  inns1  rents and in  employeest  bargaining per  (or 
agency costs).  These conditions introduce the possibility of rentxapture  by 
employees, although the models differ in the identity of agents and enforce- 
mentmechanisms.  The players are clearest in the case of unionism; otherwise, 
the workerst  bargaining agent is not obvious, although econdsts  have long 
noted the existence of informal organization by nonunion workers (mop 
[I9571  ) ,  including uniorrthreat ef  feck versions (Dickens [I9861  )  and manage- 
rial capitalism/agency  cost versions (Aoki  [1984]). 
This paper focuses on the alternative explanation that wage differ- 
ences among employers simply reflect randm errors by wage-setters.  Seminal 
articles by Stigler  (1962)  and Rothschild and Stiglitz  (1976) launched a fam- 
ily of pure information models that use costly job search to explain wage 
dispersion.  Expensive job search allows the market to sustain a range of 
wages because a workerts  gain from further search becanes uncertain, rather 
than a known quantity.  While mean wages for a particular type of worker are 
equal to the workert  s marginal product, the costs of information introduce  an 
error term with a variance that is a positive function of the search and mo- 
bility costs for workers or employers.  Thus, if employers adjust all workerst 
wages in tandem, errors may be correlated across occupations for an employer. 
Most previous empirical studies of interemployer wage differentials 
2 
have focused on national interindustry differ-.  Because of data limita- 
tions, these studies have been unable to control well for local labor market 
conditions or detailed occupation, to oampare differentials between industries 
to those within industry, or to investigate the stability of employer differ- 
entials over time. 
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This paper provides new insight into establishment+ased wage varia- 
tion, using a unique data set prepared for the author by the U.S.  Wlreau  of 
Labor Statistics.  The wages of nonsupewisory white- and blue-collar workers 
in one city are examined to see whether employer differentials exist within a 
single labor market, whether they are stable aver the course of six years, and 
whether they are associated with growth or shrinkage  of the establishment. 
Wage variation between industries is also canpared to that within industry. 
In addition, the results are ccrmpared to those in  the Current Population Sur- 
vey in order to estimate the mrtance  of interemployer wage variation as a 
source of wage variation in the econmy  as a whole. 
The results  cast light on the nature of wage differences among employ- 
ers and on the plausibility of other propcsed sources of wage variation by 
employer.  A  number of previous studies find it unlikely that employer differ- 
entials arise fram systematic sorting of workers by measured or umeamred 
3 
ability within occupation.  Even stronger empirical evidence tends to refute 
the hypothesis that wage differences among employers campensate for establish- 
4 
mentwide variations in working conditions.  This paper provides evidence of 
substantial wage differences among employers within a single city.  This find- 
ing greatly reduces the possibility that regionvide campensating differentials 
5 
for cost of living are the main source of employer differentials. 
The major contribution of this paper is the finding that interemployer 
wage differences, and rankings  of employers by wage, are virtually stationary 
over six years.  This result eliminates random variations (generated or per- 
petuated by costly information) as a likely sou.  of employer differentials. 
The persistence of establishment wage differentials is consistent with earlier 
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findings that employer wage differ-  are associated with measurable charac- 
teristics of employers, such as establishment size and product market (Groshen 
[1988b]  ) . 
Process of elimination leaves the door open for the two provocative 
types of models of employer wage variation  (efficiency wages and rentsharing) 
that have generated considerable interest.  The conclusion identifies several 
key characteristics  of interemployer  wage differentials that need to be ac- 
counted for in any version of these models invoked. 
11.  The Data 
The data used in this study are a unique set canpiled for the author 
by the U.S.  Wlreau of Labor Statistics, from Area Occupational Wage Surveys 
(AWS)  for a single metropolitan statistical area (PEA) over the course of six 
years.  The variables include the wage, sex, occupation, and establishment 
identifier of individual workers in nonsupemisory positions.  Wages are the 
straight-time hourly wages  (no  overtime or shift premia included) of hourly 
workers, and the average hourly earnings of incentive workers.  Although con- 
fidentiality restrictions  prohibit the release of employers' names, the data 
include unique establishment identifiers and two plant characteristics: size 
class and two-digit Standard Industry Classification  (SIC) code. 
This survey has the follming  advantages: it allows control for %A, 
it includes many different industries,  and it is longitudinal in establish- 
ments.  In addition, the surveys cover a broad mix of occupations:  white-  and 
blue-collar, professional, skilled, and unskilled.  The occupations surveyed 
belong to four major groups:  clerical/office workers, professional personnel, 
custodial/materialwement workers, and maintenance/tool~powerplant  occu- 
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pations.  (mix  A  presents a ccarp?lete list of the occupations covered in 
the survey.  ) 
An important feature of these data is specificity of the occupation 
definitions, which are actually job classifications and are more detailed than 
fdgit  Dictionary of Occupational Titles or Census codes.  For example, 
secretaries are divided into five occupation classes, de-  on their re- 
sponsibilities, and distinguished from other clerical occupations such as 
stenographers  (three classes), typists  (three classes), and file clerks  (four 
classes).  This level of detail pravides strong control for human capital as 
productively used.  (Groshen [I988131 tests this assertion.)  For brevity in 
the discussion that follaws,  the term occupation will be used instead of AWS 
job classification, the more accurate term. 
In total, the particular survey analyzed below covers 88 occupations 
and 241 establishments in  42 two-digit  SIC categories.  Confidentiality re- 
strictions prevent the Wlreau of Labor Statistics fram releasing the identity 
of the MSA  or the exact years covered.  The MSA is described as located in  the 
northeast region of the country and not widely dispersed geographically.  The 
6 
six consecutive years fall between 1974 and 1981. 
Table 1  presents a summary of characteristics of the sample.  Almost 
half  (108)  of the establidmmts  are covered for the full six years; the re- 
mainder are fairly evenly split between those present for the first three 
years and the last three years, except for the few  (7  percent) with missing 
data for one or more years.  Thus, the data cover 1,008 establishmnt-year~. 
In any year, well over half of the establishments are among those covered for 
the full six years.  Approximately 17,000 individuals are surveyed per year, 
for a grand total of 101,990 abservations. 
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Because the AWS occupations are found in many different industries and 
firms,  the labor markets for such occupations may be more ccnnpetitive than the 
markets for more indus-ific  or firmspecif  ic occupations.  Workers can 
be apected to be more mabile when their skills are readily transferable among 
many different employers.  Thus, we would expect the wages of workers in AwS 
occupations to be more standard across qloyers  than would the wages of work- 
ers in less cammon occupations. 
Hawever, because they are coaanon to most firms, AWS occupations gener- 
ally work outside the major productive activities of the establishments sur- 
veyed and capture a relatively mall  proportion of the employees in most es- 
tablishmmts.  There are two alternatives to this approach.  The first, analy- 
sis of industq-spcific  surveys that include the occupations most prevalent 
in each industry, is taken by Grc6hen (198833).  The second solution is to 
contract  job classifications into  broad occupational categories and survey all 
occupations and industries, as  is done in household surveys.  The analysis 
presented here includes a caparison  of the results fram the AWS  to those from 
industry surveys and fm  the Current Population Survey. 
111.  The Size and Stability of ~lo~er  Wase Differences 
A.  Technicwe 
Of particular interest in the study of interemployer wage differences 
is a measure of their importance, that is, the relative contribution of em- 
ployer wage differences to total wage variation.  This &ion  partitions the 
variance of wages into the portions associated with particular effects using 
analysis of variance (ANOVA)  techniques. 
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At any time, wages are hypothesized to depend on an individual's occu- 
pation, employer, the interaction between employer and occupation, and an 
individual cmponent.  If virtually all productive differences in human capi- 
tal and working conditions are between, not within, nanmly  defined occupa- 
tions, then occupation dummies capture all significant differences in  human 
capital and working conditions among jobs.  GrOShen (1988b) examines this 
issue and finds that the standard human capital variables  (age, education, and 
race) add little explanatory per  to regressions with three-digit occupa- 
tional dummies in  the Current Population Survey.  Given the detail of the 
occupation distinctions in these surveys, the human capital variables can be 
expctd to explain even less of the remaining variation in  these data.  In 
order to control as fully as possible for differences in worker quality, the 
actual estimation includes dununies for sex and incentive pay along with occu- 
pation.  For ease of expsition,  this set of variables is referred to simply 
as ttoccupation.w 
The test for the importance of employer characteristics is to measure 
the size and significance of employer variables included in a wage equation 
with human capital variables.  The first set of variables are establishment 
durmny variables, to capture the average deviation of employees fm  their 
occupation means a-  all occupations.  This effect, the fixed effect of 
employer on wages, is the main focus of this analysis. 
Second, variations in employer differentials among occupations are 
captured by including variables for the interaction of occupation and estab- 
lishment, which estimates an additional wage differential for each occupation 
in each plant.  In this paper, this will be called an employee's lljob-cell.tt 
The equation estimated is as follaws: 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copy(1)  w  =p+Xa+Yp+xYr+  E 
ijk  i  j  i  j  i jkf 
where wijk  = ln(wage) of employee k  in occupation i at employer 
p  = mean wage for the population, 
Xi  = vector of occupation dunmry variables, 
a  = vector of occupation wage differentials, 
Yj  = vector of establishment dummy variables, 
p = vector of employer wage differentials, 
XiYj  = vector of job-cell dummy variables, 
r = vector of wage differentials  for jab-cells,  and 
eijk  = randcarly distributed error term. 
Since all of the independent variables are dichotanous, equation  (1) 
can be rewritten, and wages may be understood, as the sum of a series  of 
differentials  : 
w  =p+a-+p  +7..+E 
ijk  1  j  11  ijk
f
 
th  ,th 
wherea-,  8,  and r  arethe i , 3  ,  and ijth  elements ofthe  a, 8,  and r 
1  j  i  j 
vectors, respectively,  and p is the overall mean wage.  Over time, any of 
these four capnents  may change, htmducing  coefficients  on their interac- 
tions with year.  These year-interaction coefficients capture trends or tempo- 
rary deviations from average relative position aver the six years and may be 
estimated in an expanded version of equation  (2) : 
t  t  t  t  t 
(3)  w  =p+a-+a  +p  +P +r +T  +E 
ijk  1  i  j  j  i  j  i  j  ijk 
The differentials can be understood as follows: 
1) Occupation differential (ai)  is an occupation's average deviation 
fm  mean wages, across all establishments.  Presumably, these premia reflect 
pmductivity and campensating differences among occupations. 
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ation from its cswn mean wage in  a particular year, across all establishments. 
These movements reflect responses to tmporary labor -ply  shocks or adjust- 
ments tamd  new long-run positions. 
3) Establishment differential (Pj  )  is  the employees' average deviation 
from occupation mean in an establishment,  across all occupations.  Thus, these 
encconpass many differentials proposed in earlier research:  size  of employer, 
h-dustry, penxntage  female, union, etc. 
4) Establishment-year differential (Pt  )  is the employees1  average 
deviation from establishment mean in a particular year, across all occupa- 
tions.  These movements reflect responses to temporary shocks or adjustments 
toward new long-run positions. 
5) J-11  (interaction) differential (rij) is paid to a particular 
job-cell abwe  the occupation and establishment differentials.  High variance 
in this term indicates significantly different internal wage structures among 
employers. 
6) Job-cell-year differential (rt j)  is  the job-cell deviation from 
mean in a particular year.  High variance in this term indicates instability 
in the internal wage structures of employers. 
7) Within job-cell  (individual)  differential (et  jt)  is an individual 
or residual deviation from the mean for an occupation in an establishment in a 
year, presumably the result of individual productivity differences  or differ- 
ing compensation strategies  on the part of employers  (for  example, incentive 
versus day rates).  The more that wages are tied to individuals or to 
short-run performance rather than to job,  the larger is this cmponent. 
Note that equations  (1)  and (2)  express the same model in different 
notation.  Equation  (3)  estimates the same model as in equations  (1) and (2), 
but is  fully interacted with time.  If the differentials in equation  (3)  are 
mutually independent  (this  issue will be considered belm)  , the total variance 
of wages may be partitioned as follows: 
The size of each variance cmponent  estimate indicates its relative 
econdc  hprtance.  And, the variation associated with interactions  between 
a cmpnent  and year meafllres the stability of wage differentials associated 
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with the ccmpnent  over time.  Our interest is the economic and statistical 
significance  of the differentials as groups, fllrm~lrized  by the relative size 
of the variance ccmpnents  and their interactions, as follows: 
2 
1) d  and o  measure the importance and stability of external occu- 
a  at 
pational labor markets, respectively; 
2)<and$  measure the importance and stability of employer wage 
Bt 
differentials in wage determination, -ively; 
2 
3) d  and o  measure the importance and stability of independent 
7  7t 
internal labor markets, respectively; and 
4) d  measures the importance and stability of individual differ- 
r t 
ences within job-cell. 
The essential complication  to the discussion above is that variance- 
ccmpnent  deccanposition as shown in equation  (4)  is not straightforward when 
data are unbalanced.  An unbalanced design produces multicollinearity between 
the vectors of dwany variables  (X  and Y  )  in equation (I), which prevents a 
i  j 
simple separation of the impacts of X and Y.  If an establishment employs a 
relatively large number of workers in  skilled occupations, we cannot distin- 
guish whether a differential paid to those workers is due to their employer or 
7 
to their occupations. 
Thus, the technique applied is a decamposition of the sum of sqyares 
8 
of wages, rather than an explicit estimation of variance ccmpnents.  This 
method provides a measure of the ambiguity arising fm  design imbalance and 
does not require the imposition of structure on estimated differentials. 
The summary of the technique provided in table 2 shm  huw a series  of 
ordinary least squares (OLS)  regressions is used to make the jump from equa- 
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tion  (3)  to equation  (4).  Wages are regressed successively on different sets 
of regresors.  Cthanges in the coefficient of determination  (that  is, the sum 
of squares explained as  a  proportion of total) are used to partition the sum 
9 
of squares of wages into aanponents comespriding  to those in  equation (4). 
2  2 
Use of the R standardizes a  to a value of one. 
W 
First, in the pooled sample, log wages are regressed separately on 
vectors of occupation and establishment dummies and then on both sets of dum- 
mies together  (called  the full mairref  fects model)  .  The marginal contribution 
of each set of dummies to the full main-effects model (over the equation with 
the other one alone) measures the portion of wage variation associated unam- 
biguously with that factor.  These correspond to minimum estimates of the 
relative size of the variance contributed by occupation and differentials, or 
2  2  2 
a  and a .  The difference between the R of each in the equation alone and 
a  B 
their marginal contribution to the full main-effects equation is a measure of 
their joint (collinear,  or ambiguous) explanatory per. To identify the 
industry effect, industry dummies are substituted for establishment durmnies. 
Next, the exercise is repeated with interactions between the main 
2 
effects and year, in order to estimate the relative size of a  and 2 , 
at  Pt 
which indicate the stability of the main-effect estimates.  The contribution 
2 
of all other interaction differentials, including job-cell  (a  )  and 
7 
2 
job-cell-year differentials  (a  ) ,  is the difference between the explanatory 
7t 
power of a regression on job-cellyear  dummies and that of the full 
2 
(time-interacted)  main-effects model.  The individual contribution  (a  )  is 
ct 
the variation unexplained by job-cell-year dummies. 
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B.  ANOVA of the Area Wase Survey 
Table 3 presents the ANOVA of wage data fram the area wage survey. 
The first column reports the degrees of freedom for each source of 
10 
variation.  The  second column reports the percentage sum of squares, or in- 
crement to <,  captweii~each  mume.  me  total sum of squares reported 
excludes the effect of annual means,  which were extracted prior to the analy- 
sis presented.  The third colunm records Fstatistics  where appropriate. 
The top six raws fllmmarize the impact of the main effects:  job clas- 
11 
sification,  sex, incentive and establishment.  Together, these factors ac- 
count for 90 percent of the observed variation in wages.  The joint contribu- 
tion of the ma&  effects dominates, claiming 51 percent of total variation. 
This reflects an uneven distribution, or hmmplete  overlap, of occupations 
among establishments in the sample.  The marginal contributions of establish- 
ment over occupation, and vice versa, are 19.3  percent and 19.5  percent, 
respectively: about equal,  and both highly significant statistically. Each 
acplains samewhere between 19 and 71 percent of total wage variation (71 per- 
cent is the marginal contribution plus the joint portion of variation). 
The fixed establishment cmponent  of variation can be divided into the 
portions between industries and within industry.  Betweerrindustry variation 
is 11.4 percent of total variation  (almost 60 percent of the marginal estab- 
lishment total)  ,  leaving 7.9  percent for within-industry variation.  Both 
portions have significant Fstatistics.  So, while industry captures a large 
part of the differences between establishment, it does not capture it all. 
These results indicate that larye establishment differentials exist 
within MSAs.  The estimated establishment differentials have a lqe  range: 
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we cannot reject the possibility that employer differentials a.  as important 
as occupation, sex, and incentive pay in the determination  of wages. 
The importance of the interactions with time and between occupation 
and establishment are examined in depth below.  The final category is individ- 
ual variation, which accounts for only 3 percent of total wage variation. This 
12 
suggests that individuals in the same  jhll  are paid very similarly. 
C.  The Uniformity of Establishment Differentials Across Oamational  Groups 
The tenth raw of table 3, !la11 other interactions," masures  the con- 
tribution of all interactions not explicitly listed in  the raws above. These 
interactions include job-cell and jhllyear  interactions (which 
2  2 
a  and a  ):  differences in age-earnings profiles, in  the relative treat- 
7  7t 
ment of job-cells by establishment, and changes in  these over time.  'Ihis 
group of interactions is significant  as a whole, but accounts for just 6.3 
percent of total variation.  That is, the most comemative  estimate of the 
contribution of employer main effects-19  pescent-is  three times as large as 
the interaction contribution.  The size of this term suggests that relative 
cccupational wage strub  are probably fairly similar among these estab- 
lishments. 
Another way of examining the consistency of establishment differen- 
tials across occupational groups is to obtain and capre  independent esti- 
mates for the four general occupational groups in  the sample.  Correlations of 
the employer wage differ-  across groups are shown in  table 4. 
The upper panel lists correlations across groups when industry effects 
are included in establishment effects.  For instance, the correlation between 
the establishment differentials of office workers and those of maintenance, 
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toolrooan and powerplant workers is .635.  The correlations are similar in 
magnitude to those obtained in LeoaTd (1987)  and Groshen and Krueger  (1989). 
Rank order correlations  (listed  below the standard Pearson  correlations) do 
not differ substantially. 
The lower panel shows the cross-occupational consistency of establish- 
ment effects within industry.  Again, the correlations are generally quite 
high.  In fact, the correlations involving professional and technical workers 
rise after controlling for industry.  The smallest correlation (.306) occurs 
between office occupations and material movement and custodial workers. Appar- 
ently, interindustry differentials account for the bulk of the consistency in 
interesbblishment  differentials between these two groups. 
In general, though, these results suggest that establishment differen- 
tials have consistent size and rank am  occupations, even within industry. 
D.  The Stability of Establishment Wase Differentials 
The pattern of establishment and occupation wage levels in this survey 
remains'umhanged  over six years.  'Ihis can be inferred fram raws 7 through 9 
of table 3, which suggest that occupation and establishment differentials are 
remarkably stable: occupation and establishment interactions with year con- 
tribute a total of less than 1  percent of observed variation.  Rnployer dif- 
ferentials are only slightly less stable than occupation differentials. 
Another demonstration of the stability of establishment differentials 
is the lack of decay in  y-ear  correlations as the gap between obsema- 
tions lengthens.  Table 5  pmts  correlation coefficients  (both  Speaman and 
Pearson) of estimated establishment differentials across th.  The correla- 
tion coefficients of estimated differentials for the same establishments in 
different years are strikingly high, starting at .99  for oneyear  differences 
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and barely decaying to  .97  for estimates six years apart. The picture for 
rank-order correlations is much the same:  coefficients decline only to .95 
13 
after six years. 
The lower panel of table 5 shm  the persistence of within-industry 
establishment differentials.  Although somewhat lmer  than the persistence of 
differentials that include imlustry effects, the correlations are still re- 
markably high:  they decline only to .894 (. 856 in  rank order) over the course 
of six years. 
So, not only are employer differentials stable in  size over time, but 
the relative rank of employers by size of differential is also stationary for 
periods as long as six years.  F'urthermre, the lack of any rapid decay over 
the period suggests that the patterns are probably stable for much longer than 
the six years included in  the survey. 
E.  Conversion into Standard Deviations 
Table 3 partitions the sums  of squares, but does not indicate esti- 
mated variances for the components of interest.  Table 6  presents results of 
multiplying the percmtage  of the sum of squares due to each factor by the to- 
tal variance of the sample, and then taking the square root to generate the 
suggested standard deviation.  In order to stack the deck against the investi- 
gated effect, the joint effects from table 3 are allocated capletely  to occu- 
pation. 
The results can be converted to standard deviations in  two ways. 
First we see the entire establishment effect, including the imlustry effects. 
This generates a standard deviation of .18, which we can interpret as a per- 
centage of the mean because wages were estimated in  log fom. We can also 
extract two-digit industry effects fram the estimated establishment effects. 
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This leaves intra-industry variation with a standard deviation of 12 percent, 
strikingly similar to the estimate of 11 percent in  the industry surveys in 
GrOShen  (1988b).  The similarity of these results,  despite the very different 
sources, lends confidence to the findings. 
Huw big are these nwS3ers in practical tenns?  The experiment that 
this research tries to simulate is the randm transfer of a worker in one 
establishment to a job in the same  occupation at another establishment.  What 
14 
is the expcted wage change from such  a switch? 
Converting the suggested standard deviations in  table 6  to expded 
wage changes, a random switch in establishment within industry  (within job 
classification, sex, city, and incentive class) yields an expecbd 12 percent 
Change (in absolute value) in wages;  a switch that might be between indus- 
tries is expe&ed  to g-te  a 19 percent wage change.  These differem=es  are 
cconparable to average wage differences between union and nonunion employers, 
and correspond to differences of $2,100 and $3,300 per year, respectively, of 
the average wage of $17,000 earned by a blue-collar production worker in  manu- 
facturing in 1984.  Switching employers within hdwtry results in  a very 
larye expeckd incame  change, as larye as that from a switch in  occupation 
within industry.  In addition to the stability they shuw, the sheer size of 
these differentials makes  it unlikely that they are caused by random varia- 
tions. 
F.  Ekwloyer Differentials and Wase Variation in the Current mulation  Survey 
A large portion of current research in  labor economics is based on log 
wage regressions of Current Population Survey  (CPS)  data, but at least half of 
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the wage variation in the CPS  remains unexplained after inclusion of tradi- 
tional measures of human capital.  What portion of that Wnexp1ainedw1  varia- 
tion is actually due to employer differentials? 
B  ampares variance canponents  estimates for the s&industry 
Industry Wage Survey  (IWS) average in Groshen  (1988b), for the AWS, and for 
the May 1977 CFS.  The IWS estimates are the simple means fmm  ANOVA of the 
wages of production workers in six manufacturing industries. The AWS  estimates 
are repeated from table 6, except that the effects of all interactions with 
time have been remved. 
Since these three data sources are quite different, adjustments for 
the differences are necessarily speculative.  The conclusion reached is that, 
ccarrpared to total wage variation in the CPS,  estimated variation due to estab- 
lishment differentials is larye, even by consemative measures. 
N. Establishment Size, Growth.  and Shrinkage Differentials 
The employer wage differentials estimated above are presumably linked 
to characteristics of the employers, some  of which have been identified, such 
as size of firm and size of establishment  (Brawn  and Medoff [1987]).  This 
section investigates the link between wages and another characteristic of 
establishment-grwth  or shrinkage of employment. 
In these data, grawth and shrinkage dummy variables can be created 
from dxqes  over time in size class.  Since Leonard (1989)  finds that the 
size of establishment is surprisingly volatile, the first attempt to measure 
the influence of size change on wages uses net change in the size of employ- 
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ment at an establishment to measure grawth and shrinkage.  Eunnnies for growth 
and shrinkage were entered separately in order to allow for lack of symn~try 
in lags or for stickiness in  either direction. 
The upper panel of table 7 compares the contribution to explanatory 
power of size and the size change (m  3 of the table) to that of establish- 
ment dummies (m  2)  ,  controlling for occupation and industry  (row 1)  .  The 
purpose is to measure hm  much of employer variation within industry can be 
linked to size and size change.  The results indicate that establishment size 
alone and dummy  variables for establishment growth and shrinkage account for 
more than 19 percent of within-industry wage variation by employer in the AWS. 
Only 3 percent of this is contributed by the growth and shrinkage variables. 
The lower panel of table 7 presents the coefficient estimates for the 
regression equation in m 3 in  the upper panel.  Except for the smallest size 
class, wages increase monotonically with size, and we estimate a negative 
differential for growth and a negligible one for shrinkage. 
Table 8 presents the dts  of four other attempts to link estimated 
establishment differentials and changes in  estimated differentials to growth 
or shrinkage of the establishment.  The question is whether size change leads 
to greater or smaller wage changes than would be expckd just fm  the ad- 
justment to wages of the new size class. 
If growth or shrinkage is exogenously determined and information is 
costly,  then an employer's growth may raise its efficient wage under the turn- 
over version of the efficiency wage hypothesis (see Salop  [1979]).  The wage 
increase is profiti~ximizing  because, during growth, the employer needs to 
attract or retain a higher proportion of workers than it does in a steady 
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state.  Similarly, an qloyer  that needs to shrink its work force may allow 
relative wages to fall below previous levels.  Attraction of new workers is 
unnecessary and quits are perhaps desirable. 
A  second explanation for the same association canes fm  the bargain- 
ing  model.  Suppose that establishment growth resulted frcnn  su-t  is, 
high profits--and shrinkage frm  low profits.  Then, gxuwth would indicate the 
presence of high wages because large rents were available for distribution. 
By the same logic, shrinkage would indicate lower wages. 
However, if grawth is endogenous, the zero-sum aspect of bargaining 
raises the possibility of the opposite relationship.  If profits captured by 
workers would otherwise be used for expansion, then high-gmwth canpanies 
could be those with low wages.  And  shrinkers  could be doing so because of 
their  .high  wages.  This is the same  prediction and causality generated by the 
simple campetitive  model in  the short run.  Im  wages lead to higher profits 
and, therefore, growth,  unless the low wages induce quits, and thus, 
shrinkage; high wages should erode profits and cause shrinkage.  Included here 
is the obsewation  that since most hires are at the bottam of pay ranges, a 
hiring surge could appear to lower wages by lowering average tenure in a 
plant. 
To summarize, the turnover version of the efficiency wage hypothesis 
predicts a  positive relationship between growth and wages.  The bargaining 
model is ambiguous, depending on the exogeneity of growth, and the simple 
cmpetitive  model predicts a negative relationship, or none at all. 
The first two columns of table 8  present regression coefficients for 
the effect of establishment growth and shrinkage on estimated establishment 
differentials, controlling for industry and size.  The effect of shrinkage may 
be negative, occurring before the shrinkage takes place.  The effect of growth 
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is also negative, but relative to the wages of establi-ts  in  the new size 
class, not the old one.  'Ihis suggests that wage changes may lag behind 
gmwth, but precede shrinkage.  That is, wages may be sticky uyxh.rards during 
size change.  Sh  the coefficient on growth is small and insignificant rela- 
tive to that on past size, and the coefficient on shrinkage is small and in- 
significant relative to that on current size, the mavement in wages is appar- 
ently not greater than that associated with a change of size category. 
However, the third column of table 8  diminishes confidence in the last 
point.  In order to allow for more cmplete  adjustment and to increase the 
signal-to-noise ratio, this column presents regressions of net changes in 
estimated differentials on net changes in size.  Neither growth nor shrinkage 
has a large or significant impact on change in differentials.  The sign of the 
coefficient on shrinkage mimes  to positive but is small.  Growth is esti- 
mated to reduce wages by 1  percent  (with  no controls for size), but the esti- 
mate is not significantly different fran zero. 
These data do not conclusively support any of the three hypotheses 
above. The first two columns suggest that wages are sticky upwards.  If any- 
thing, wages are apparently lower for f  inns  that grow,  but shrinkage has lit- 
tle or no effect.  And, neither result is stable under alternative formula- 
tions  (that is, relative to wages of employers of the same size). 
Thus, although size changes affect wages because wages hcrease with 
size, neither growth nor shrinkage appears to have a simple, consistent effect 
on wages, holding size constant.  me  data reject the efficiency wage and the 
ex0g-  bargaining predictions of a positive relationship between 
grawth  and wages.  me  correlation between wages and grawth, if there is one, 
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appears to be negative.  It is even less likely that shrinkage is correlated 
with wages; but if so, shrinkage is also associated with  (slightly)  lmer 
wages. 
V.  Conclusion 
A.  flmaMlN of Findims 
The conclusions of this analysis are as follows: 
(1) Twenty to 70 percent of wage variance within this MSA  is due to 
employerbased differences both between and within industry.  The most conser- 
vative estimate of the standard deviation due to employer differentials within 
hdustry is 12 percent.  Ccanbined with industry effects, this generates a 
standard deviation of approximately 18 percent:  a major portion of the 50 
percent total standard deviation of wages. 
(2)  Establishment wage cliff-  and rankings  (even within industry) 
are virtually stationary for periods at least as long as six years, and proba- 
bly for longer. 
(3)  While establishment size can account for much of measured employer 
wage effects within industry, establishment growth and shrinkage do not have a 
simple,  consistent relationship with employer wage levels or wage changes. 
Thus, even across occupations as diverse as  those in  the area wage 
survey,  employer differentials are applied relatively uniformly.  -ed  to 
occupational means,  employers tend to ampensate  janitors as well  (or  as 
poorly) as they do industrial nurses, canputer programmers, millwrights, and 
stenographers.  F'urthkre, employers are also very consistent in their pat- 
terns aver time. 
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Occupation  (including sex and incentive) and employer differentials 
are clearly extremely important in wage determination.  These factors, when 
well identified, as in these surveys, can explain more than 95 percent of wage 
variation.  Thus, other characteristics of the individual (for exarrple, ten- 
ure, mrital  status, or race) must operate through job classification or 
thmugh  employer in order for them to have a  large effect on wages.  Other- 
wise, they are not highly influential in  the determination of wages. 
In short, since a  large impmement  in  earnings can be attained only 
through a pramotion or a change of employer, barriers to entry into highly 
remunerative occupations or establishments can have a  devastating impact on 
the earnings of otherwise-cpalif  ied workers. 
B.  Irmlication for Sources of Establishment Waqe Differentials 
These results cast more light onto the nature of wage differences 
among employers and onto the plausibility of proposed sources of wage varia- 
tion by employer.  Of the five sources of employer wage differentials that 
have been modeled (sorting by worker quality, ccrmpensating differentials, 
randam variations, efficiency wages, and insider bargaining)  ,  evidence in 
previous studies renders the first bo  possibilities unlikely. 
The evidence presented above rejects the third possibility, random 
variations, as the source of employer differentials.  The strong stability of 
establishment differentials over time provides canpelling evidence against the 
hypothesis that establishment differentials are tmporary fluctuations.  If 
the differentials are random but not temporary,  then they are extremely costly 
for high-wage employers, which suggests that labor-market information must be 
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even more costly.  Wlt, the results of this survey and many other private 
substitutes are available to finns on a fairly timely basis at no cost  (or at 
the cost of participation). 
Fbrthermore,  the extent to which the differentials persistently  (since 
at least the 1940s) depend on easily identified establishment characteristics, 
such as industry and size of establishment, makes the randrnn variations 
hypothesis unlikely.  For instance, it is implausible that personnel officers 
of laqe  fh  have been consistently wrong, all mistakenly setting their 
wages too high for 40 years.  Thus, the randrnn variation theory of establish- 
ment differentials may be ruled out. 
The finding of substantial wage differences among employers within a 
single city also argues against the possibility that regiomide capensating 
differentials for cost of living are the main source of employer differen- 
tials, although urban wage gradients within the city are still a possibility. 
Process of elimination also suggests the need for serious consider- 
ation of efficiency wage and rent-sharing (insider/outsider) models.  This 
paper identifies several key characteristics of interemployer wage differen- 
tials that need to be present in any version of these models invoked. 
First, employer wage differentials are found among whitecollar  work- 
ers, as well as blue-collar workers, in a nationally representative set of 
industries.  The pewasiveness  of these differentials qes  for explanations 
that apply aee-board  to all occupations in an establishment, and to the 
establishments in  most industries.  Thus, occupatiorrspecific difficulties in 
monitoring are not a likely source, because the occupations surveyed here are 
very diverse.  Also unlikely are explanations that appeal to the characteris- 
tics of a single industry. 
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Second, although wages and size of establishment have a  strong posi- 
tive correlation, plant size change has no sirnple, consistent relationship 
with wage level.  Thus, the versions of efficiency wage and renkcharing mod- 
els based on growth or shrinkage of establishment are unlikely sources of 
interemployer  wage differences. 
M,  since employer differentials are quite persistent on an annual 
basis, while annual profit rates of U.S.  cmpmies are notoriously volatile, 
if these differentials are rent.,  they presumably reflect longrun,  not 
short-run, rents. 
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1.  Groshen (1988a)  reviews the empirical and theoretical literature examining 
employer differentials. 
2. Exceptions to this generalization are a  gmup of studies by ecodsts  in 
the 1940s and 1950s summarized in Segal (1986).  GrOShen (1988b) provides 
recent evidence of large establishment wage differentials among production 
workers in  six manufacturing industries, using national industry wage surveys. 
3. Groshen (1988b) finds it unlikely that intra-industry employer variations 
are due to sorting by termre, experience, education, or for variations in 
umeasured  worker ability correlated with these meafllres of human capital. 
Dickens  and Katz (1987) find that interindustry differentials cannot be ex- 
plained by the three measures of human capital.  And,  Gibbons and Katz  (1987) 
conclude that interindustry wage differences are not associated with unmeas- 
ured differences in productive abilities. 
4. Attempts to identify the working conditions for which  interindustry wage 
variations cmpemate  have been notably unsuccessful, as have attempts to 
identify compensating variations in general (Elram  [I9801 and Smith [1979]). 
5.  However, urban wage gradients within the city are still possible (Eberts 
[I9811  ) . 
6. These years were characterized by historically high inflation rates, which 
might be apckd  to result in more random behavior because of more costly 
information, and in more real downward wage flexibility on the part of employ- 
ers. 
7. Techniques for estimation of variance cmponents  of a model of unbalanced 
design are detailed in Searle  (1971)  and Henderson  (1953) .  Restricted maximum 
likelihood  (Ill&) techniques are introduced in Hoching, Hackney and Sped 
(1978).  Ill& provides simple estimates of variance capnents  and their stan- 
dard errors at the expense of imposing a rigid structure on the distribution 
of level effects and errors.  Because the appropriateness  of the structure 
imposed may vary among industries, and because the  of this study is to 
investigate the characteristics of establishment differentials, a nonparamet- 
ric method was preferred for this analysis.  Groshen (1986)  provides a cam- 
plete discussion and examples of the application of alternative ANOVA tech- 
niques to similar data. 
8. The technique used here avoids the essence of ANOVA1s  difficulty with un- 
balanced data.  A variance is a sum of squared deviations divided by the ap- 
propriate number of observations  or degrees of freedom.  In data with an un- 
balanced design, the correct number of degrees of freedom is unknam, so vari- 
ance estimates must rely on estimates of the correct degrees of freedom. Such 
estimates require the impsition  of structure on the data. 
9. The following work concentrates attention on proportions of variance rather 
than on F-statistics for two reasons.  First, because of the large sample 
sizes, all of the Fstatistics  are strongly significant (the critical value is 
1 in  most cases), even if the economic significance is slight.  Second, estab- 
lishment identity is presumably an inefficient measure of the econcanically 
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differences and thus identifies the maximum amount of variation that under- 
standing of employer wage policy could explain. 
Hwever,  as a  measure of the source of employer differences, estab- 
lishment may be finer than necessary.  If so, the F-statistic can mislead 
because it averages out the inpact of all estimated levels.  While the addi- 
tional variation explained by unnecessary levels is negligible, the number of 
degrees of freedom used can be high, reducing the F-statistic.  The inclusion 
of irrelevant levels washes out the significance of the relevant ones. 
The F-statistic of a factor X is defined as follows: 
where RRSS = restricted residual sum of squares, URSS = unrestricted residual 
sum of squares,  k = number of restrictions or levels in parameter x, and n = 
degrees of freedom in  unrestricted equation  (that is, number of observations 
minus degrees of freedom used by other regressors)  . 
If k  is the number of correctly specified levels of the factor X, then 
let 6 = measure of irrelevant fineness in another measure, say Y.  That is, 
suppose instead of using k levels, we use the 6k levels of Y, where 6>1. 
Then, as long as the levels of X are a linear mination  of the levels of Y, 
and n is large relative to 6k,  the URSS  of the equation will be almost the 
same, the RRSS will be the same, so the F-statistic of the inefficient parame- 
ter Y  is as follows: 
And, the ratio of Fy to Fx  (for n large relative to k) is 
Fy/Fx  (n-6k)  k/  [  (n-k) 61 = [ (w6)  -k]/  (n-k)  1  1/6. 
The maximum of the ratio is one (where  X=Y, so 6=1); otherwise it decreases 
monotonically with increasing 6,  -and  app&ches  1/6  for n large and k small. 
So the size of the F-statistic depends not only on the economic relevance of 
the parameter measured, but also on the inefficiency with which it is meas- 
ured.  Since the purpose of this work is to identify the potential explanatory 
per  of variables based on establishment, I focus primarily on the percentage 
sum of squares explained by factors rather than thmqh FLstatistics. 
10. The number of degrees of freedom is determined by the number of dunnny 
variables used in the regressions.  For example, in the case of establish- 
ments, the number of degrees of freedom is the number of establishments  minus 
one. 
11. The immtive  dummy equals one when the worker in  question has an incen- 
tive component to his or her earnings.  These incentives may be in the form of 
individual or group piece rates, individual or group bonuses, or carmnissions. 
12. This is the result for industries with a low proportion of incentive-based 
ccarpensation in Groshen (1988b). 
13. These are quite similar to the results obtained by Mackay, et al. (1971) 
and Nolan and Brawn  (1983) in England. 
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tween two identically distributed random variables.  Assuming a normal distri- 
bution of differentials, the question reduces as follms: 
where d = randm  differential, distributed N(o,~~),  and @[0]  and 9[0] are the 
normal density and the dative  normal density functions, evaluated at zero. 
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Best available copyOccupations Surveyed in the Area  Wage Suwey 
Office Occupations 
Secretaries: Classes A, B, C, Dl  E, and Not Classifiable By -el 
Staqraphers: Senior, General,  and Not Classifiable By Level 
Transcribing-Machine Typists 
Typists: Classes A, B, and Not Classifiable By Level 
File Clerks: Classes A, B, C,  and Not Classifiable By Level 
Switchboard Operators 
Switchboard Operator-Receptionists 
Order Clerks: No Level Distinctions, Classes A, B, and Not Classifiable 
Accounting Clerks: Classes A and B, and Not Classifiable By We1 




Machine Billers, Not Classifiable By Level 
Payroll Clerks 
Key Entry Operators: Classes A, B, and Not Classifiable By Level 
Tabulating-Machine  Operators: Classes A, B, and C 
Professional and Technical Ommations 
Canputer Systems Analysts (Wlsiness): Classes A, B, C, and Not Classifiable 
Cmpter  Programmers  (Wlsiness)  : Classes A, B, C, and Not Classifiable 
Cmpter  Operators: Classes A, B, C, and Not Classifiable By Level 
Drafters: Classes A, B, C, and Not Classifiable By Level 
DraEter-Tracers 
Electronics Technicians: Classes A, B, C,  and Not Classifiable By Level 
Peripheral Equipment Oprators 
Cmpter  Data Librarians 
Registered Industrial Nurses 
Maintenance, Toolroam and  Material Movement and Custodial 
EQwemlant  Cccwations  Ommations 
Main-  Carpenters  Truckdrivers: Light Truck, Medium Truck 
Maintenance Electricians  Heavy Truck, Tractorlkztiler,  and 
MainteMnce Painters  Not Classifiable by Category 
Main-  Mechanics (Machinery)  Guards:  No Level Distinction, 
Maintenance Mechanics  (Motor Vehicles)  Classes A, B, and Not Classifiable 
Main-  Pipefitters  Shippers 
Maintenance Sheet-Metal Workers  Receivers 
Millwrights  Shippers and Receivers 
Maintenan&  Trades Helpers  Warehousemen 
Machine-lbol Operators (Toolroam)  Order-Fillers 
Tool and Die Makers  Shipping Packers 
Stationary Engineers  Material Handling Laborers 
Boiler Tenders  Forklift Operators 
Pawer-Tnlck  Operators  (Other Than 
Forklift) 
Janitors, Porters,  and Cleaners 
Watchmen 
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'Ihis appendix presents variance components estimates for the 
skhiiustq  Industry Wage Survey  (IWS)  average in Groshen (1988b), for the 
Area Occupational Wage Surveys (AWS), and for the May 1977 Current Population 
Survey (CPS) .  May 1977 was chosen as a year within the ranges of both the AWS 
and IWS. The qle  includes all priva-r,  full-th  employees between 
the ages of 18 and 65 with reported average hourly earnings of more than $1.75 
per hour. 
The IWS estimates are the simple means fram ANOVA  of the wages of 
production workers in six manufacturirq industries.  The technique used in 
Groshen (1988b) is identical to that used here, except that all data are 
-ional,  and so differentials are estimated without explicit interac- 
tions with year. The AWS  estimates are repeated from table 5, except that the 
effects of all interactions with time have been removed. 
These three data sources are quite different, so adjustments for the 
differences are necessarily speculative.  For instane, the standard deviation 
of wages in  the AWS,  .40,  is double the mean for the six industry wage surveys 
(.20).  As  noted abave, area wage surveys cover a  broader mix of occupations, 
both blue-collar and whitecollar.  Moreover, area wage surveys include the 
effects of interindustry wage variation.  The BS includes all of the sources 
of variation already mentioned, in addition to the full range of occupations 
in the econcnny. 
The first two raws of table B-1 present the least ccarparable rnrmbers 
across the three surveys:  standard deviation estimates for total dispersion 
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and those due to occupation, sex, region, and kdustry differentials. 
Reported AWS and IWS figures allocate the entire joint occupation 
establishment effect to occupation.  In the IWS,  the variance in the first row 
includes regional variation, but not interindustry variation.  In the AWS, the 
variation in the first row includes interindustry variation, but no regional 
variation. 
In the CPS, the first m captures both industry and regional sources 
of wage variation, in  addition to occupation and sex.  The level of detail of 
region, sex, and industry are roughly the same  in the AWS and CPS, but CPS 
three-digit occupations lack the detail of the job classifications in the IWS 
and AWS.  The CPS variation in  the first mw  is the same as that of the AWS, 
despite the higher total variance in the CPS.  This suggests that variation 
within the CPS  occupational categories is greater than the variation between 
regions in the country.  Iack of occupational specificity leaves more wage 
variation unexplained than the addition of regional controls can capture. 
Another way to judge the impact of broad occupation data in the CPS  is 
to note that in  the plastics industry, contraction of the 42 BLS job classifi- 
2 
cations into 12 CPS occupational categories reduces the R of the equation by 
one half, frcnn 49 percent to 25 percent.  In an ANOVA as shown,  at least half 
of this differenrjudging  frm  the size of the contribution Itjoint"  to occu- 
pation and establishment-might then be claimed by establishment differen- 
tials, raising the estimated employer effect in the CPS. 
The second row shows the remaining variation for each sample.  These 
are quite similar for the AWS and IWS:  a  standard deviation of about .16. 
The CPS, however, retains a standard deviation of .31, almost twice as high. 
The next three rows present speculative estimates of the size of the 
within-industry establishment effect in the CPS,  in order to provide bounds 
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for the probable contribution of establishment to CPS  wage variation.  The 
first method takes the point estimate of standard deviation fram the IWS and 
AWS:  .11.  Although this is a large portion of the unexplained standard devia- 
tion of  .31, the estimate is conservative for two reasons.  First, CPS occupa- 
tions are very broad.  The large joint cmponent  of variation in the IWS and 
MS  would shrink with these broad occupations, increasing the size of the 
estimated establishment impact on variation.  Second,  the IWS and PIWS  oversam- 
ple large establishments and amit the smallest ones.  In these data, estimated 
establishment variance is highest among the smallest establishments.  Thus, 
the CPS  should provide more establishment diversity because it samples evenly 
fram all sizes of employer. 
The second estimate assigns the AWS  establishment percentage of total 
wage variation to establishment in the CPS, and comerts this to a standard 
deviation of  .13.  The result is very similar to the first estimate and has 
the same limitations. 
The third method is less conservative and assigns to establishment the 
same percentage of remaining variation (after occupation, industry, etc.  )  as 
is found in the AWS.  That converts to a standard deviation of .20. 
In order to see if the limited number  of occupations surveyed in the 
AWS  accounted for these results, the last column of table 6  presents the same 
exercises on the subsample  of CPS  obsewations  for workers in  AWS occupations. 
(They totalled 24 percent of the CPS sample.)  The variance of wages is lower 
in the subsample,  but the entire decrease in variance is in the between- 
occupation portion of variance.  This leaves the estimates of establishment 
effect virtually the same,  increasing confidence in them. 
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Eiut  how  mu&  of  the remaining variation is actually noise?  The  rea- 
sons CPS  wage  reports may  have a larger noise+o-signal  ratio than BLS wage 
surveys are as follaws: 
1)  CPS  average hourly earnings are -t  imprecisely defined  (they 
include eamhgs fm  overtime or shift pda  or froan  second jobs)  ; 
2)  CPS  respondents1  memories are probably subject to  more error than 
are the establishment records used by  the BLS; 
3)  CPS  data-cleaning is far less thorough than BLS efforts; and 
4)  CPS  occupations are subject to large reporting error. 
So,  the nonoccupation variation in the CPS  is probably biased ulJwards. 
Thus,  campared to total wage  variation in the CPS,  estimated variation due to 
establishment differentials is large,  even by conservative IIEISW~S. 
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Characteristics of Area Wage Survey Sample 
Mean Wage  $5.68 
1 
Vari-  of In (Wage)  .I74 
1 
Standard Deviation of In  (Wage)  .42 
Number of Observations  101,990 
Nuniber of Occupations  88 
Number of Establishments  241 
Male  59.3% 
Receive Incentive Pay  2.2% 
Establishment  Percent of 
Size  obsewations 
Year of Observation 
Major Industry Group  Percent of 
(1-Disit  SIC)  Obsewations 
2.  Nondurable Manufacturing  10.0% 
3.  IXlrable Manufacturing  28.8% 
4.  Transport. and Utilities  11.0% 
5.  Wholesale and Retail Trade  17.3% 
6.  Financial Services  12.8% 
7.&  8.  Fersonal and 
Wzsiness Services  19.7% 
Number of Years Observed 
'~et  of annual effects. 
Source:  Tabulations from the BLS Area Wage Survey, unidentified area in  the 
Northeast for six consecutive years between 1975 and 1982. 
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Tkchicpe  for Partitioning Sum of Squares in Unbalanced Data 
Source of Variation 
FEEent  of Total 
Sum of squares' 
1.  Occupation, Sex,  Incentive  (controlling for estab.)  *c  -  *B 
2. Joint Occupation and Establishment  $A  +  - SC 
3.  Establishment and -try  (controlling for occup.,  etc.  )  *c  -  *A 
4.  Industry (controlling for occupation, etc.  )  *c  -  *A 
5. Establishment Within Industry  *c  - *c 
6. Total Main Effects  *c 
7. Occupation, etc., -Year Interactions  *CT  -  *BT 
8. Joint Occupation, etc., and Establishment  *AT  + *BT  -  *CT 
9. Establishment Year-Interactions  *cT  -  *AT 
10.  All Other Interactions  (controlling for main effects)  *D  - *c 
11.  Total Between Job-Cell-Years  R', 
12.  Individual  100% - $, 
'IWI'AL  100% 
'The subscripts on the coefficients of determination correspond to the regression 
models listed below.  Occupation, sex, and inoentive are listed as occupation, 
for ease of exposition. 
A.  wijtf  = p  + $a  +  eijkt  AT.  w..  t = p  + ?a + ?tat +  eijrt 
Ilk 
B.  W--' = p  + Yip  + eijk t  wi  jkt  = p  + Yip  + yjtpt + Ei jk  t  Ilk 
C.  wijtf  = p  + ?a + Yip  +  eijtf  C.  wijtf  = p  + %a + l(i@  + eijC 
cr. wijtf  = p  + %a + %'at  + yjp + yjtpt +  eijk t 
D.  W-.t  =p  + ?a + xitat +Yip  + yjtpt  + 3Yjr + ?t~jtrt  + eijkt 
Ilk 
where wi  -tf = In wage of individual k  in  occupation, establishment j, and year t  4 = vector of occupation dummy variables for occupation i 
Y. = vector of establishment dummy variables for establishment j  $ = vector of ittiustry dummy variables for industry -j 
XiYj  = durmnies for occupation i in establishment j, i.e.,  for job-ell ij, 
a,  p,  ,gl  r = vectors of estimated parameters,  and 
the superscript t denotes variables and parameters that vary over time. 
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Analysis of Sources  of Wage Variation Within an Area1 
Saurce of Variation 
Degrees  Percent of 
of  Totalsum  F- 
Man  of squares  statistis 
1.  Occupation, Sex and Incmtivd  89 
2.  Joint Occupation, etc. ,  and Establishment  - 
3.  Establishment and Industry3  240 
4-  Industry3  41 
5. ~stablishment  Within Industrf'  199 
6. Total Main Effects  329 
7.  Occupation, etc. -Year Interactiod  436 
8. Joint Occupation, etc. and Establishment  - 
9.  ~stablishment-Year  ~nteractiod  767 
10. AI.~  other ~nteractions~  11,230 
11. Total Between Job-Cell-Years  12,762 
12. Individual  89,222 
m 
Total Sum of Squares 
'All reported figures are net of main annual effects. 
2Controlling  for industry and establishment. 
3Controlling  for occupation, sex, and incentive. 
4Controlling  for occupation, sex, irmentive, and industry. 
5~ntrolling  for main effects and establishment-year interactions. 
6Controlling  for main effects and occupation, sex, incentive-year 
interactions. 
7Controlling  for main effects and their interactions with year. 
8All I?-statistics  are significant at well above the 1% level. 
Source:  Tabulations fm  BIS Area Wage Survey. 
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Correlations of Estimated Establishment Wage Differentials 
over p our Occupational ~roupsl 
A.  Including Industry Ef  fects' 
TYPE OF  Professiondl  Maintenance, Tool-  Material Movement 
CORRELATION  and Technical  Room and Ewerplant  and Custodial 
Off  ice  Pearson  .854 
Rank  .788 
Professional  Pearson 
andTechnical Rank 
Maintenance, 
Toolroam,  and  Pearson 
Ewerplant  Rank 
B.  Controlling for Industry Effects1 
- - 
TYPE: OF  Professional  Maintenance, Tool-  Material Movanent 
CORRELATION  and 'lkdmical  roam and Powerplant  and Custodial 
Off  ice  Pearson  .886 
Rank  .892 
Professional  Pearson 
and'l'khical Rank 
Maintenance, 
Toolrwmand  Pearson 
Powerplant  Rank 
'Results weighted by nunker of observations in establishment.  Estimated 
establishment differentials are average differentials  (taken from independent 
regressions for each occupational group) over period in which the 
establishment was observed. 
Source:  Tabulations from BLS Area Wage Survey. 
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Correlations of Estimated Establishment Differentials Over Six Years 
A.  Including Industry ~f  fectsl 
TYPE OF  Year 
CmFEmTION  2  3  4  5  6 
1  Pearson 
Rank 
2  Pearson 
Rank 
Year  3  Pearson 
Rank 
4  Pearson 
Rank 
5  Pearson 
Rank 
B.  Controlling for Indusby ~ffd 
TYPE OF  Year 
(30RREXATION  2  3  4  5  6 
--  -  -  - 
1  Pearson  .975  .968  .909  .904  .894 
Rank  .970  .962  .891  .869  .856 
2  Pearson  -  .974  .925  .924  .906 
Rank  -  .969  .909  .897  .871 
Year  3  Pearson 
Rank 
4  Pearson 
Rank 
5  Pearson  -  .959 
Rank  -  .969 
'Results  weighted by number of observations in establishment. 
2F&ults weighted by number of observations in establishment. Industry-year 
effects are excluded.  Establishments in industries with only one 
establishment are also omitted. 
Source:  Tabulations fm  BLS  Area Wage Survey. 
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Sqgested Standard Deviations for 
Area  Wage Survey 
Source  Sugyested Standard Deviation1 
Occupation 
Establishment (Including Industry) 




'  ~uggested  standard deviation=  [  (category proportion of CSS)  x  (total 
variance)  1".  Joint contribution is allocated to occupation. 
Source:  Tabulations from BLS  Area Wage Survey. 
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Camparison of Regression on Establishment IMmtnies 
with Regressions on Establishment Size in the Area Wage Survey 
A.  Cumparison of Explanatory Fkxer 
Eq.  Independent Variables 
AF# 
F#  fram Eq.  1 
(1)  Occupation, Sex, Incentive and 
2-Digit SIC  81.8 
(2)  Occupation, etc. and 
Establishment Ikmmies 
(3)  Occupation, etc., SIC, 
Establishment Size Category 
and Net Size Change  83.3  +1.5 
RATIO OF EXPLANAKIRY  POWER OF FSTABLI- 
SIZE TO ESTABLISHMENT IXlMMIES  .I90 
B.  Coefficients fram Regression of In (Earnings) on Establishment Size 
Variable 
Coefficient or 
Number  of txmmlies  (Std. Error) 
Occupation 
Male 












Source:  Tabulations fram BLS Area Wage Suwey. 
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Effect of Establishment Size Change on Estimated 
Establishment Differentials in the Area Wage Survey 
merit  Variable 
Current  Net Change in Estimated 
Estimated Establishment  Establishment Differential 
Differential  Over Survey Period 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Coefficient on 
Establishment Shrinkage  -0.005  -0.052~ 
DUIUIIY  (std. error)l  (0.024)  (0.023) 
Coefficient on 
Establishment Growth  -0.  04g2  -0.011 
r~many  (std. error)l  (0.024)  (0.025) 
Other Controls  2-Digit SIC,  2-Digit SIC, 
Current  Previous 
Estab.  Size  Estab. Size 
$  0.712  0.711 
F-Stat. for Size Changes  2.02  2.67 
Sample  Size  767  767 





Average nmber  of 
observations in 
establishment 
'~rawth  and shrinkage are defined as positive or negative changes 
(respectively) in the establishment size category.  For Equations 1  and 2, the 
change is frcan the last year to present.  For Equation 3, it is net change 
over the survey period. 
'significant at the 5% level. 
3~ntrol  for years spanned is necessary because the calculation and 
elimination of annual ef  feck  may intmluce bias  (due to sample variations) in 
year-to-year caparisons  of wage effects. 
Source:  Tabulations fram BLS Area Wage Survey. 
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Industry and Area Wage Survey Standard Deviation Conpnents 
Ccanparea to Current Population  Survey Log Wage Variation 
Source of 
Variation 
of Log Wage  -  wage  Area Wage  auTent  Population 
Survey  Survey  -Y 
%KIM  fw5J-  May 1977~ 
Standard  Standard  All  AWS 
Deviation  ~eviatiod  Occup-  o~cup-~ 
Total Std.  Dev.  .20 
occupation, Sex, Region, 
and/or -try1  .12 
Total Remaining  .16 
Establishment  (known)  .ll 
Establishment  (Estimated) 
1)AWS &  IWS Point Estimate - 
2)AWS  %  of Total  - 
3)AWS  % of Remaining  - 
Occupation-Establishment 
Interaction  .06 
Individual  .09 
 or  IWS and CPS, includes SMSA  durrony and region  (4  regions for CPS)  .  For IWS 
and AWS  includes incentive durrany and joint effects.  In CPS, uses 3-t 
occupation.  CPS and AWS  tatals include 2-digit idustry. 
2~ffects  of interactions  with year have been excluded frcnn AWS  results. 
3The  CPS saqle  includes all priva'kssecbr  fulltime  workers between the ages 
of 18 and 65 with reported average hourly earnings of more than $1.75. 
41ncluding  only observations for occupations included in  the AWS  saqle. 
Source:  Tabulations fm  BLS  Area Wage Survey, BLS Industry Wage Surveys (see 
Groshen  1988b), and May 1977 CPS. 
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